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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to show some economic outcomes of the
application of optimal control to marketing. We present two dynamic
models. In the first one we consider a firm that seeks to reach a fixed
level of goodwill at the end of the selling period, with the minimum
total expenditure in promotional activities. The firm can only control
the communication expenditure rate. In the second one we consider a
vertical control distribution channel where a manufacturer sells a single
kind of good to a retailer. The manufacturer’s profit maximization
is considered in an optimal control model where the manufacturer’s
control is the discount on wholesale price (trade discount). The optimal
discount policy of the manufacturer turns out to depend on the efficiency
of the retailer and his sale motivation. Finally we also consider the
manufacturer-retailer relationship in a differential game framework: the
manufacturer’s control is again the trade discount while the retailer
controls the pass-through to the market.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we present two types of dynamic models for marketing.
In section 2 we consider a firm that seeks to reach a fixed level of goodwill at
the end of the selling period, with minimum total expenditure in promotional
activities. We consider the linear optimal control problem faced by the firm
which can only control the communication expenditure rate; communication
is performed by means of advertising and promotion. Goodwill and sales
levels are considered as state variables and word-of-mouth effect and saturation
aversion are taken into account. We show that the structure of the optimal
communication depends on the relation between the negative factors for the
firm (saturation aversion and goodwill decay) and the the positive ones (word-
of-mouth and goodwill productivity). Moreover, we can understand that the
structure of the optimal communication is bang-bang and identify the number
of switches, even if the total description of the optimal communication can be
done only numerically.
In section 3 we consider a vertical control distribution channel where a man-
ufacturer sells a single kind of good to a retailer. We assume that a discount
in wholesale price increases the retailer’s sales motivation and consequently it
increases sales. We study both the manufacturer’s and retailer’s profit maxi-
mization problems as optimal control models. The manufacturer’s control is
the discount on wholesale price (trade discount) allowed to the retailer. The
retailer’s control is the part of trade discount transferred by the retailer to
the market consumers (pass-through). The optimal control of manufacturer’s
and retailer’s profit via trade discount and pass-through is embedded in a
differential game framework.
Let us remark that our aim here is to give an idea of the models and of
the results obtained. So we omit the proofs of the results, which are rather
technical, or give only “the sketch” of the proof. The detailed proofs can be
found in [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7].
2 Minimization of communication expenditure
The problem of planning media schedules and communication mix expenditure
over time has received growing attention in the recent past and a number of
aggregate advertising response models have been proposed in literature since
the pioneering works of Vidale and Wolfe [22] and Nerlove and Arrow [18]. The
key idea of Nerlove and Arrow was to take into account explicitly the goodwill
level reached by a firm or product; the goodwill depends on the expenditure
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in advertising and is subject to a decay due to the forgetting effect. More
precisely the dynamics in the model of Nerlove and Arrow is described by the
linear differential equation
A˙(t) = a(t)− δA(t) ,
where A(t) is the goodwill level at time t, a(t) is the advertising spending rate
at time t and δ is the goodwill decay rate. A number of generalizations of the
model, with suitably defined profit functions to be maximized, can be found
in literature (see e.g. Feichtinger, Hartl and Sethi [10]).
Here we consider a firm that sells goods and seeks for the optimal commu-
nication plan over a finite time horizon: this leads to a linear optimal control
model.
Similar models were recently proposed by Favaretto and Viscolani [9], Bu-
ratto and Favaretto [1], Funari and Viscolani [11]. In particular in [9] an opti-
mal control model for production, advertising and selling of seasonal goods is
considered where production and advertising take place in a first time period
while in a second consecutive time period the firm can sell the good, continuing
the advertising activity.
In our model we focus on the interaction of different promotional activities
during the selling period. In fact we take into account not only advertising
expenditure but also other important features of the communication mix, like
sales promotion and word-of-mouth. Moreover we include in the model a
market saturation effect.
We assume that the aim of the firm is to reach at the end of the selling
period a level of goodwill previously defined by the management: this can be
useful, for example, when reaching high levels of goodwill allows to exploit
hysteresis properties of the response function [15], [14], so that it is possible
to keep the level of goodwill with low economical effort. At the same time we
assume that the firm requires to sell its whole inventory.
To reach its targets the firm spends in promotional activities but since,
as it is well known, many brands are overspending in advertising, a careful
minimization of costs is required and the firm tries to minimize the total ex-
penditure in communication.
To be more precise, we assume that the communication expenditure rate is
the only control allowed to the firm and that communication is performed by
means of advertising and sales promotion. In the linear optimal control model,
goodwill dynamics depends not only on the advertising effort but also on the
sales level due to the effect of word-of-mouth.
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High levels of goodwill improve sales, of course, but selling activity de-
pends directly also on sales promotion and on sales level itself. In particular,
the increasing level of goods already sold will reduce sales speed due to the
progressive saturation of the market. Sales level changes instead, depend di-
rectly on sales promotions efforts and on the reached sales level and take into
account congestion aversion.
2.1 Formulation of the Problem
As mentioned in the previous section, we propose a linear optimal control
problem to model the dynamics of selling and communication activities of
a firm. Of course, linearity is a strong assumption but, since we consider a
firm that sells seasonal goods, the time period in which the dynamics evolves is
limited and short enough so that a linear model can be considered a sufficiently
good approximation of reality.
Since the selling period is short we also assume that the marginal effects
of communication activities are constant and positive both with respect to the
sales and to the goodwill of the firm. The total expenditure rate in commu-
nication is bounded and divided a priori by the management into two parts,
one for advertising and one for promotion.
The motion equation we consider for the goodwill generalizes the one pro-
posed by Nerlove and Arrow [18] and is given by
A˙(t) = ϕx(t)− δAA(t) + γAρa(t)
where
A(t) = goodwill level at time t,
x(t) = sales level at time t,
a(t) = communication expenditure rate at time t,
δA = goodwill decay parameter, δA > 0,
γA = advertising productivity in terms of goodwill, γA > 0,
ρ = weight of the total expenditure rate devoted to advertising, ρ ∈ [0, 1]
and ϕ is the word-of-mouth productivity in terms of goodwill. Thus the word-
of-mouth effect increases the goodwill rate whenever ϕ > 0 while a negative
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word-of-mouth effect corresponds to ϕ < 0 (5). In the following we will restrict
our attention to the case of a favorable word-of-mouth, i.e. ϕ > 0 (6).
The sales level dynamics will be defined by the equation
x˙(t) = −θx(t) + δxA(t) + γx(1− ρ)a(t)
where
δx = goodwill productivity in terms of sales, δx > 0,
γx = promotion productivity in terms of sales, γx > 0,
and θ > 0 is a saturation aversion parameter: in fact this way the sales rate
decreases as the cumulative sales increase, modeling the market saturation
effect. Factor (1 − ρ) is the part of the total expenditure rate devoted to
promotion.
During the selling period the firm requires to reach a fixed goodwill level
A˜ starting from the initial level A and to sell the total inventory m.
This way the following optimal control problem can be formulated [3]
P : minimize
∫ t2
t1
a(t) dt,
subject to x˙(t) = −θx(t) + δxA(t) + γx(1− ρ)a(t)
A˙(t) = ϕx(t)− δAA(t) + γAρa(t)
x(t1) = 0, x(t2) = m,
A(t1) = A, A(t2) = A˜,
a(t) ∈ [0, a],
where [t1, t2] is the selling period and a > 0 is the upper bound for the com-
munication expenditure rate.
2.2 Preliminary assumptions
We will assume that problem P satisfies the general position condition (GPC)
(see e.g. [20], p.166), which guarantees the uniqueness of the solution, if any.
5) The role of parameter ϕ is rather similar to the seller’s reputation in Spremann’s model
[21].
6) This is only done in order to restrict the number of sub-cases to consider; negative
values of word-of-mouth are of course possible in practice, e.g. when selling a low quality
product which is initially perceived by the market, due to unfair advertising, as a high
quality product.
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The “regularity” of the problem required by this assumption is considered
quite natural in optimal control since in practical problems non-zero coeffi-
cients are known only with some approximation.
Remark that our assumption requires in particular that θδA − ϕδx 6= 0
and we will see that θδA−ϕδx = 0 is a threshold for the qualitative properties
of the optimal control of problem P .
Another technical assumption that we will adopt throughout the paper is
that the control is continuous from the left and continuous at the end point t2
(see e.g. [20], p.73).
2.3 Types of optimal control
The system of motion equations of problem P can be rewritten as
X˙(t) = QX(t) +B(a(t)), (1)
where
X(t) =
(
x(t)
A(t)
)
, Q =
(−θ δx
ϕ −δA
)
, B(a(t)) = a(t)
(
γx(1− ρ)
γAρ
)
.
To apply the Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle [19] we need to compute the
eigenvalues of matrix −QT which are
λ1 =
θ + δA −
√
(θ − δA)2 + 4ϕδx
2
, λ2 =
θ + δA +
√
(θ − δA)2 + 4ϕδx
2
.
Remark that, since we assumed ϕ > 0, we have λ1, λ2 ∈ IR, moreover λ2 > 0,
λ2 > λ1, and the sign of λ1 coincides with the sign of θδA − ϕδx (7).
Due to the GPC assumption and since the eigenvalues are real, the optimal
control is “bang-bang” and the number of switches in the optimal control
cannot be more than two [20].
The following Proposition explains how the sign of λ1 determines the type
of optimal control.
Proposition 2.1 (See [3].) If θδA < ϕδx (i.e. λ1 < 0) then the optimal
communication policy can only be of type
a∗(t) =

a, t ∈ [t1, τ1)
0, t ∈ (τ1, τ2)
a, t ∈ (τ2, t2]
(2)
7) This implies that, under GPC assumption, λ1 6= 0; the special case in which λ1 = 0 is
considered, under some more restrictive hypotheses, in [9].
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with switch times τ1, τ2 such that t1 ≤ τ1 ≤ τ2 ≤ t2;
if θδA > ϕδx then the optimal communication policy can only be of type
a∗(t) =

0, t ∈ [t1, τ1)
a, t ∈ (τ1, τ2)
0, t ∈ (τ2, t2]
(3)
with t1 ≤ τ1 ≤ τ2 ≤ t2.
From Proposition 2.1 we have
Corollary 2.1 If problem P has some admissible control then one and only
one of the following communication policies a∗ is optimal:
“ALTERNATE a− 0− a communication”: some τ1, τ2 exist such that
a∗(t) =

a, t ∈ [t1, τ1)
0, t ∈ (τ1, τ2)
a, t ∈ (τ2, t2]
;
“ALTERNATE 0− a− 0 communication”: some τ1 and τ2 exist such that
a∗(t) =

0, t ∈ [t1, τ1)
a, t ∈ (τ1, τ2)
0, t ∈ (τ2, t2]
;
“EARLY communication”: some τ1 exists such that
a∗(t) =
{
a, t ∈ [t1, τ1)
0, t ∈ (τ1, t2] ;
“LATE communication”: some τ1 exists such that
a∗(t) =
{
0, t ∈ [t1, τ1)
a, t ∈ (τ1, t2] ;
“MAXIMUM communication”: a∗(t) = a ∀t ∈ [t1, t2] ;
“NO communication”: a∗(t) = 0 ∀t ∈ [t1, t2] .
2.4 Admissible optimal controls
In order to find admissible optimal controls we have to consider system (1) with
t belonging to some interval [ t′, t′′ ] ⊆ [t1, t2] and the control a(t) constant
and either equal to zero or equal to a, as stated in Proposition 2.1.
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Let S be a matrix, whose i-th column is an eigenvector of matrix Q (see
system (1)), corresponding to eigenvalue −λi . For example, matrix S can be
written as
S =
(
δx δx
θ − λ1 θ − λ2
)
.
Remark that S is nonsingular since λ1 6= λ2. Let us define
Λ =
(
λ1 0
0 λ2
)
= −S−1QS ,
which is a nonsingular matrix due to the GPC assumption. Further, define
D(t) = etΛΛ−1S−1B(a).
Then the solution of (1) on the interval [ t′, t′′ ] can be written as
X =
{
Se(t
′−t)ΛS−1X(t′), if a(t) = 0
Se−tΛ{et′ΛS−1X(t′)−D(t′) +D(t)}, if a(t) = a . (4)
At this point, using (4) we can write the dynamics of the system depending
on the optimal control. Moreover, requiring continuity of the optimal trajec-
tories, we can specify the conditions on switch times that allow to have an
optimal control, as given in Proposition 2.1. To simplify notation we define
the following constant vector
G = et2ΛS−1X(t2)− et1ΛS−1X(t1) .
Proposition 2.2 (See [3].) The optimal trajectory for problem P is:
a.
X∗ =

Se−tΛ{et1ΛS−1X(t1)−D(t1) +D(t)}, t ∈ [t1, τ1]
Se−tΛ{et1ΛS−1X(t1)−D(t1) +D(τ1)}, t ∈ [τ1, τ2]
Se−tΛ{et2ΛS−1X(t2)−D(t2) +D(t)}, t ∈ [τ2, t2]
with τ1, τ2 such that t1 ≤ τ1 ≤ τ2 ≤ t1 and
D(τ1)−D(τ2) = G+D(t1)−D(t2) , (5)
if the optimal control is “alternate a − 0 − a communication” or “early
communication” (τ2 = t2) or “maximum communication” (τ1 = τ2 = t2);
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b.
X∗ =

Se(t1−t)ΛS−1X(t1), t ∈ [t1, τ1]
Se−tΛ{et1ΛS−1X(t1)−D(τ1) +D(t)}, t ∈ [τ1, τ2]
Se(t2−t)ΛS−1X(t2), t ∈ [τ2, t2]
and τ1, τ2 such that t1 ≤ τ1 ≤ τ2 ≤ t1 and
D(τ2)−D(τ1) = G , (6)
if the optimal control is “alternate 0 − a − 0 communication” or “late
communication” (τ2 = t2) or “no communication” (τ1 = τ2 = t2).
By means of Proposition 2.2 we can outline how any instance of problem P
can be solved. To this aim let us first remark that if τ2 = t2 then equation (5)
becomes
D(τ1) = G+D(t1) (7)
while (6) writes
D(τ1) = −G+D(t2) . (8)
Moreover, if τ1 = τ2 = t2 then (5) becomes
G = D(t2)−D(t1) (9)
and (6) becomes
G = (0, 0)T . (10)
Now it is possible to describe an algorithm to solve problem P .
Compute λ1.
If λ1 < 0 then check conditions (9) and (10). If one of them is satisfied we
have maximum or no communication, respectively, and the algorithm stops.
Otherwise the systems of two equations (7), (8) and (5) must be considered. If
one of them has solution belonging to the interval [t1, t2] then the corresponding
optimal control is determined, otherwise problem P has no solution: this way
the problem is completely solved.
Remark that while systems (7) and (8) can be explicitly solved, system (5)
must be solved numerically. Anyway, since at most one of them has solution,
not necessarily all of them must be solved.
If λ1 > 0 then the procedure is the same but one has to consider system (6)
instead of (5).
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2.5 Parametric analysis
In this section we show how optimal communication policies vary depending
on the boundary conditions.
To this aim we look for a graphic representation of the sets of boundary
values of total inventory m, initial and final goodwill levels A and A˜, for which
the structure of the optimal control is of the same kind.
We will use the conditions on τ1 and τ2 given in Proposition 2.2. More
precisely: if λ1 < 0 then in “alternate a− 0− a communication” case some τ1
and τ2 must exist such that t1 < τ1 < τ2 < t2 and (see (5) and (4))
(eτ1Λ − eτ2Λ)Λ−1S−1B(a) = G+ (et1Λ − et2Λ)Λ−1S−1B(a); (11)
while if λ1 > 0 then in “alternate 0− a− 0 communication” case some τ1 and
τ2 exist such that t1 < τ1 < τ2 < t2 and (see (6) and (4))
(eτ2Λ − eτ1Λ)Λ−1S−1B(a)G. (12)
The space in which we give the parametric representation of the types of
optimal control of problem P is obtained transforming the space of parameters
m, A, A˜, in a suitable two dimensional space.
In order to define this transformation let(
d1
d2
)
= S−1B(a) ,
(
g1
g2
)
= G .
It is easy to show that, under GPC assumption, di 6= 0, i = 1, 2, therefore we
can also define
ki =
gi
di
. (13)
This way equation (11) can be rewritten as
eλiτ1 − eλiτ2 = λiki + eλit1 − eλit2 , i = 1, 2 ,
and (12) becomes
eλiτ2 − eλiτ1 = λiki , i = 1, 2 .
We will work now in the space of k1, k2 (the definition of ki see in (13)), it
means that we will not work in the three-dimensional space of variables A, m
and A˜, but “in terms” of them since k1 and k2 depend linearly on A, m, A˜.
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Let us define
f−(k1, k2) =
1
λ1
ln(eλ1t2 − λ1k1)− 1
λ2
ln(eλ2t2 − λ2k2) ,
and
f+(k1, k2) =
1
λ1
ln(eλ1t1 + λ1k1)− 1
λ2
ln(eλ2t1 + λ2k2) .
It is now possible to state the following Theorem.
Theorem 2.1 (See [3].) If f+(k1, k2) > 0 or f−(k1, k2) > 0 then there is no
feasible control for problem P ; otherwise the optimal control of P is:
“alternate a − 0 − a communication” if f+(k1, k2) < 0, f−(k1, k2) < 0 and
λ1 < 0;
“alternate 0 − a − 0 communication” if f+(k1, k2) < 0, f−(k1, k2) < 0 and
λ1 > 0;
“early communication” if f+(k1, k2) = 0 and f−(k1, k2) < 0;
“late communication” if f+(k1, k2) < 0 and f−(k1, k2) = 0;
“maximum communication” if f+(k1, k2) = 0, f−(k1, k2) = 0 and h1 = h2 = 0;
“no communication” if f+(k1, k2) = 0, f−(k1, k2) = 0 and k1 = k2 = 0.
From Theorem 2.1 we have that the set
V1 = {(k1, k2) | f+(k1, k2) < 0, f−(k1, k2) < 0}
is the region in the space of parameters k1 and k2 in which the optimal control
of problem P is alternate communication, “alternate a−0−a communication”
if λ1 < 0, “alternate 0− a− 0 communication” if λ1 > 0.
The sets corresponding to the other kinds of communication are
V2 = {(k1, k2) | f+(k1, k2) = 0, f−(k1, k2) < 0} early communication curve ,
V3 = {(k1, k2) | f+(k1, k2) < 0, f−(k1, k2) = 0} late communication curve ,
V4 = {( 1
λ1
(eλ1t2−eλ1t1), 1
λ2
(eλ2t2−eλ2t1))} maximum communication point ,
V5 = {(0, 0)} no communication point .
Remark that only the set V1 is solid while the other four sets have empty
interior. It means that if a feasible control of problem P exists, then it will
probably be an alternate communication.
The above defined sets, Vi, i = 1, . . . , 5, depend only on the values of λ1,
λ2 and t1, t2. This means that given the coefficients of matrix Q, i.e. satura-
tion aversion, word-of-mouth productivity, goodwill decay and goodwill pro-
ductivity, we can understand the structure (the type) of the optimal
communication.
11
2.6 Discussion
The communication expenditure minimization model considered is rather gen-
eral and takes into consideration different generalizations of the classical Nerlove
and Arrow model which can be found in literature. Nevertheless we did not
address some typical marketing issues (8).
Our model responds dynamically to increases of communication expendi-
ture but the effect of promotion on sales (γx) is constant and does not depend
on sales level.
Linearity is a strong assumption but we consider seasonal goods and the
selling period is short. The problem we have faced might be considered an
acceptable linear approximation of more realistic models that consider concave
or S-shaped advertising return functions.
To consider only constant parameters is a shortcoming of the model too;
for example we consider the goodwill effect on sales (i.e. the parameter ²A)
as fixed but if it would depend on time and on communication efforts (see e.g
Naik, Mantrala and Sawyer [17]) this would also allow us to take into account
wearout effects, and this way the problem would become non-linear.
Nevertheless the main meaning of the proposed model relies on its simple
qualitative throughput and on putting together different promotional activities
like advertising, sales promotion and the effect of word-of-mouth.
We have seen in particular that the sign of θδA−ϕδx determines the type of
optimal alternate communication. This implies that if saturation aversion and
goodwill decay, which can be considered as negative factors for the firm, are
“stronger” than word-of-mouth and goodwill productivity, which are positive
for the firm, then it is more convenient to advertise only in the middle of the
selling period (see (3)). Otherwise it is convenient to advertise at the beginning
of the selling period and then to refresh the goodwill of the firm at the end of
the period (see (2)).
The model considered can be generalized in different ways. In [4] we con-
sider a firm which produces and sells a product in two consecutive time inter-
vals and propose an optimal control model for its marketing. The production
period state variables are the inventory level and two goodwills (one for the
consumer and one for the retailer) while the selling period state variables are
the sales level and the two goodwills. In the production period there are three
controls: on production, quality and advertising, while in the selling period
the only control allowed is on communication (cf. with the model considered
8) For a summary of the properties an advertising response model should have see e.g.
[15].
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in this work). The linear case is considered in detail and transformed into an
equivalent non linear programming problem. Moreover, in [2] we consider a
linear optimal control model for the marketing of products which are produced
by the same firm and sold by retailers in different market segments.
3 Trade discount policy in a distribution chan-
nel
In this section we discuss some results reported in [5], [6], [7], where we con-
sidered a vertical control distribution channel in which a manufacturer sells
a single kind of good to a retailer. The retailer then sells the good to the
consumers.
To earn a reasonable profit the members of a distribution channel often
adopt rather simple pricing techniques. For example, manufacturers may use
cost-plus pricing, simply defining the price adding a desired profit margin
to (variable) production costs; in a similar fashion, retailers very often use
to determine shelf prices adding a fixed percentage markup to the wholesale
price.
The main advantage of simple policies is that they are...easy to be applied.
But this blind approach to pricing does not provide tools to manufacturers in
order to encourage retailers to sell and retailers, in turn, cannot adequately
stimulate consumer to buy.
We will focus on the effects of trade promotions, a widely used dynamic
pricing strategy that manufacturers can exploit to raise sales. With trade
promotions an incentive mechanism is used to drive other channel members’
behaviors.
In particular we investigate the relationships between the members of a
distribution channel by means of optimal control models in a stylized vertical
distribution channel: a manufacturer serves a single segment market through
a single retailer and a contract fixes a trade discount policy which will be
followed by the contractors.
Trade discounts have usually a double positive effect on sales since part
of the wholesale price reduction may be transferred to the shelf price (pass-
through) and part of the discount will be kept by the retailer who will be more
motivated [15],[16], and higher motivation means higher effort in selling the
product.
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3.1 Two optimal control models
Our starting point is given by a couple of models presented in [5] and [6]
where we considered a stylized vertical channel in which a manufacturer sells
a single product during the limited time period [t1, t2]. In those models the
manufacturer sells to a single retailer, her aim is to maximize the total profit
in the given time period. By means of trade discounts the manufacturer can
raise her sales both because the retailer transfers a part of the discount to
the shelf price (pass-through) and because if the retailer will keep part of the
incentive for himself he will be more motivated in selling the specific product,
thus giving another upward push to sales.
This way two optimal control models can be considered in which the con-
trols are, respectively, trade discount (the manufacturer’s control) and pass-
through (the retailer’s control). The state variables in the models are the
cumulative sales and the retailer’s motivation.
Let us define the details of the models. Define
x(t) = cumulative sales during the time period [t1, t],
pw(t) = wholesale price at time t,
c0 = unit production cost,
α(t) = trade discount at time t, α(t) ∈ [α1, α2] ⊆ [0, 1],
β(t) = pass-through at time t, β(t) ∈ [β1, β2] ⊆ [0, 1].
Constants α1, α2, β1, β2 represent the boundary values of trade discount and
pass-through that manufacturer and retailer require not to be exceeded in order
to participate in the selling activity of the channel. In particular manufacturer
establishes the values of α2 and β1 while the retailer fixes the values of α1 and
β2.
Considering the trade discount explicitly, the wholesale price can be rewrit-
ten as pw(t) = p(1−α(t)) where p is the wholesale price when no trade discount
is applied.
Remark that x˙(t) represents the sales rate at time t; we suppose that it
coincides with the consumer’s demand at time t and that the firm will produce
exactly the quantity to be sold.
The total profit of the manufacturer can be written as∫ t2
t1
(pw(t)− c0)x˙(t)dt,
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or, since x(t1) = 0,
JM = qx(t2)− p
∫ t2
t1
x˙(t)α(t)dt, (14)
where q = p − c0. In order to obtain a non negative profit the manufacturer
will ask α2 ≤ q/p as it is shown in [5].
The total profit of the retailer is then
JR = p
∫ t2
t1
α(t)(1− β(t))x˙(t)dt. (15)
If the retailer’s sales motivation at time t, summarized by the state variable
M(t), is increasing with respect to consumer’s demand and to trade discount
then its dynamics can be described by
M˙(t) = γx˙(t) + ε(α(t)− α),
where γ and ε are strictly positive constants. Constant α ∈ (α1, α2) takes into
account the fact that the retailer has some expectations on trade prices, his
motivation decreases if his expectations are disappointed, i.e. if α(t) < α, and
increase if α(t) ≥ α.
The dynamics of the total amount of sales at time t is given by
x˙(t) = −θx(t) + δM(t) + ηβ(t)α(t),
where δ, η, and θ are strictly positive. Constant δ represents the retailer’s
selling skill while θ is needed to model the market saturation effect (e.g. large
markets will display low values of θ).
The manufacturer’s profit maximization problem leads then to the following
optimal control problem (see [5])
M : maximize JM
subject to x˙(t) = −θx(t) + δM(t) + ηβ(t)α(t),
M˙(t) = γx˙(t) + ε(α(t)− α),
x(t1) = 0, M(t1) =M,
α(t) ∈ [α1, α2] ⊆ [0, 1],
β(t) ∈ [β1, β2] ⊆ [0, 1],
where M is the initial motivation of the retailer (we assume M > 0).
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For the case of constant β(t) problemM has been investigated in [5], [6]. In
particular, it was shown that the structure of the optimal price discount strat-
egy over time has two essentially different forms depending on the retailer’s
efficiency, i.e. is selling skill, aptitude,..., which is described by the model pa-
rameter δ. More precisely if δ is less than a given threshold, which means that
the retailer is a rather bad seller, the optimal policy is to progressively increase
the discount during the selling period. If the retailer is a good seller instead,
i.e. δ lies above the threshold, the best policy is first to increase the discount
and then to decrease it. This means that a good retailer, if properly motivated
by initial discounts, can provide a good sales level also when discounts become
lower. With bad retailers it is always necessary to increase the discount to
obtain a higher profit reached through a price policy since “service” is not
good enough.
In a similar way it is possible to formulate (see [6]) a corresponding retailer’s
optimal control problem R, keeping the same motion equations and constraints
and with objective functional JR.
3.2 Trade discount policies in the differential games
framework
In [6] and [7] we addressed some preliminary considerations on the differential
game, which will be denoted by MR, defined by the objective functionals
JM , JR ,
by the motion equations
x˙(t) = −θx(t) + δM(t) + ηβ(t)α(t),
M˙(t) = γx˙(t) + ε(α(t)− α),
t ∈ [t1, t2], x(t1) = 0, M(t1) =M,
and by the constraints
α(t) ∈ [α1, α2] ⊆ [0, 1],
β(t) ∈ [β1, β2] ⊆ [0, 1].
As a first step to study the game MR in [6] and [7] we considered the
simplified framework in which both controls must take a constant value in
the whole time period [t1, t2] and these values are decided at time t1. In this
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case the solution of problems M and R becomes straightforward and allows to
obtain some properties of the differential game MR.
With constant controls α(t) = α and β(t) = β the manufacturer’s and
retailer’s profits are functions of α and β :
JM = JM(α , β) , JR = JR(α , β).
3.3 Nash equilibria
Let us look now for the Nash equilibria of the differential gameMR. Functional
JM is concave with respect to α, while functional JR is concave with respect
to β (see [7]). Nash equilibria are therefore the solutions of the system
∂JM
∂α
= 0
∂JR
∂β
= 0
In [7] we found the necessary and sufficient conditions under which Nash equi-
libria exist and, moreover, are feasible, i.e. belong to [α1 , α2] × [β1 , β2].
Further, we compared the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s profits in the dif-
ferent Nash equilibria points. In particular, we found the Nash equilibria point
which is the best for both manufacturer and retailer.
3.4 Stackelberg equilibrium
A different point of view on the channel marketing activity can be obtained
considering the manufacturer and the retailer as the two players of a Stackel-
berg game (see [8] and [12]).
We first consider the manufacturer as the channel leader: in this case
we assume that she can only choose a constant trade discount during the whole
sales period. This way we formulate the following Stackelberg game:
ML : maximize qx(t2)− pα
∫ t2
t1
x˙(t) dt, α ∈ [α1 , α2],
where, for each fixed α, functions x(t), M(t), β(t) are optimal solution of
maximize pα
∫ t2
t1
x˙(t)(1− β(t)) dt,
subject to x˙(t) = −θx(t) + δM(t) + ηαβ(t),
M˙(t) = γx˙(t) + ²(α− α),
x(t1) = 0, M(t1) =M, β ∈ [β1 , β2].
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When both controls are constant, we can rewrite the Stackelberg game this
way:
ML : maximize JM(α, β) = (q − pα)x(t2), α ∈ [α1 , α2],
where, for each fixed α, β is the optimal solution of
maximize JR(α, β) = pα(1− β)x(t2) , β ∈ [β1 , β2].
Consider now the retailer as the channel leader: we assume in this
case that he can only choose a constant pass-through during the whole sales
period. This way a new Stackelberg game can be formulated as follows:
RL : maximize (1− β)p
∫ t2
t1
x˙(t)α(t) dt, β ∈ [β1 , β2],
where, for each fixed β, functions x(t), M(t) and α(t) are optimal solution of
maximize qx(t2)− p
∫ t2
t1
x˙(t)α(t) dt,
subject to x˙(t) = −θx(t) + δM(t) + ηβα(t),
M˙(t) = γx˙(t) + ²(α(t)− α),
x(t1) = 0, M(t1) =M, α(t) ∈ [α1, α2].
When both controls are constant, the Stackelberg game can be formulated as
follows:
RL : maximize JR(α, β) = pα(1− β)x(t2) , β ∈ [β1 , β2],
where, for each fixed β, α is the optimal solution of
maximize JM(α, β) = (q − pα)x(t2) , α(t) ∈ [α1, α2].
In [7] we found the necessary and sufficient conditions under which the two
types of Stackelberg equilibria exist and, moreover, are feasible, i.e. belong to
[α1 , α2]×[β1 , β2]. Further, we compared the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s
profits in the two types of Stackelberg equilibria points. In particular, it was
found an important role of the following parameter:
C =
pK
q(H + L)
,
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where
H =
η
a
(
1− eT
)
> 0, L = −δ²
a2
(
1− eT + T
)
> 0,
K =
δ
a2
[(
aM + ²α
) (
1− eT
)
+ ²αT
]
=
δ
²
MH − αL
and a = θ − γδ, T = a(t1 − t2) (9).
Further, let (αML, βML) be Stackelberg equilibria point when manufacturer
is leader, while (αRL, βRL) be Stackelberg equilibria point when retailer is
leader. Let us denote
JMLM = JM(α
ML, βML), JMLR = JR(α
ML, βML),
JRLM = JM(α
RL, βRL), JRLR = JR(α
RL, βRL).
The role of parameter C is the following: it is possible to find C1 < C2 such
that:
1) if C < 0 or C > C1 , then J
ML
M > J
RL
M and J
RL
R > J
ML
R , i.e. both
manufacturer and retailer want to be leader;
(CONFLICT SITUATION: the struggle to be leader)
2) if C ∈ (0, C1) then JMLM < JRLM and JRLR < JMLR , i.e. both manufacturer
and retailer want to be follower;
(CONFLICT SITUATION: the struggle to be follower)
3) if C ∈ (C1 , C2) then JMLM < JRLM and JRLR > JMLR , i.e. manufacturer
wants to be follower, while retailer wants to be leader.
(THE SITUATION OF AGREEMENT!!!)
Moreover, it was found that the constants C1 and C2 do not depend
from the parameters of the models! To clarify the economical meaning
of the constants may be a theme of future research.
Another theme of the future research may be to consider the case when
feasible controls (trade discount α(t) and pass-through β(t)) are not constant,
but piece-wise constant. Moreover, it can be interesting to consider not only
the selling period, but also the production one. Finally, we could assume that
the market is not homogeneous, but segmented (cf. [2]).
9) We assume, due to economical reasons, that a > 0.
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